steverettegi
06-02-2004, 04:02 PM
Hi all
I have enjoyed working in the Material Logic book by Martin Cothran. I am having some problems with the work on definition. It seems to me that Aristotle formed a distinction between metaphysical definition and causal definition. Mr. Cothran's book does not make this distinction.
I've had many students ask me about this distinction. At first, I agreed with Mr. Cothran that the metaphysical approach and the causal approach to definition could be charaterized as one approach wherein proximate genus and specific difference, forming the species of a concept prevelant in metaphysical definition, can be effectively summarized by formal and material cause. However, after considering the issue I have found there to be considerable difference in the conceptualization of species as opposed to conceptialization of cause.
This distinction is realized in Aristotle's use of the categories and predicables in determining species wherein the categories are the material of conceptialization, their division leading to proximate genus; and the predicables, the framework of definition, through which the mind finds not only a real essence - in otherwords, an essence based in reality -
but an intellectual essence as the mind considers the universal aspects of a concept. Casual thinking is relegated to real essences as the mind considers its reality rather than its species.
Although, from a practical standpoint, casual definition is in many ways a more complete explanation of a meaning, metaphysical definition seems to summarize the way we think about something in a more efficasious manner.
I would appreciate your comments on this distinction.
Thank you very much,
Steve
I have enjoyed working in the Material Logic book by Martin Cothran. I am having some problems with the work on definition. It seems to me that Aristotle formed a distinction between metaphysical definition and causal definition. Mr. Cothran's book does not make this distinction.
I've had many students ask me about this distinction. At first, I agreed with Mr. Cothran that the metaphysical approach and the causal approach to definition could be charaterized as one approach wherein proximate genus and specific difference, forming the species of a concept prevelant in metaphysical definition, can be effectively summarized by formal and material cause. However, after considering the issue I have found there to be considerable difference in the conceptualization of species as opposed to conceptialization of cause.
This distinction is realized in Aristotle's use of the categories and predicables in determining species wherein the categories are the material of conceptialization, their division leading to proximate genus; and the predicables, the framework of definition, through which the mind finds not only a real essence - in otherwords, an essence based in reality -
but an intellectual essence as the mind considers the universal aspects of a concept. Casual thinking is relegated to real essences as the mind considers its reality rather than its species.
Although, from a practical standpoint, casual definition is in many ways a more complete explanation of a meaning, metaphysical definition seems to summarize the way we think about something in a more efficasious manner.
I would appreciate your comments on this distinction.
Thank you very much,
Steve