Traditional Logic I - Definition of "material"

[sandydjdm]

Greetings!

I am a new logic teacher for a home-school co-op group of homeschooled 8-10th graders. I'm struggling with how to clarify the use of the word "material" in Chapters 2 and 3.

When discussing Comprehension, page 16 states, "the word material means it has a body...", when refering to the notes on a Porphyrian Tree.

When discussing Supposition, verbal existence is defined as material supposition on page 25, but then on page 26 the statement is made, "We are using the term man materially," when describing the real supposition, "Man was created by God."

I find this very confusing. Could anyone clarify this for me? Thank you!

[critch]

The word material is, of course, derived from the word matter. This is the sense it has in defining a concept using the Porphyrian tree. It may help to think of material supposition as the use of a word as pure linguistic matter. A word with material supposition has no signification; it is simply a collection of letters/sounds (or linguistic/verbal matter). I don't know what Martin would say about this, but I can find no other explanation of the Medieval use of the term material.

Furthermore, I think that there may be some mistakes in the section on supposition. There seems to be some inconsistency in the use of the terms (or at least a decided lack of clarity). The medieval logicians distinguished the categories simple, personal, and material supposition. The first occurs when a concept supposits for what it signifies, or when it refers to its conceptual signification (Socrates is a man. Man is being supposited simply.) The second occurs when a word supposits for a particular (Socrates in the example of above). The last is when a term supposits only for its linguistic or verbal content, the word material it is made of (Socrates is a noun).

[martin]

To answer the original question, the use of the term 'material' in reference to supposition was purely a matter of convention when I wrote the book. It was the term used in a majority of the sources I used when writing the book. I do not recall, nor do I now know why that word has been used in this way. I have found the word 'material' has many more meanings than I would ever have supposed (how is that for a play on words?).

In response to Critch, there may very well be mistakes in this section. I know a lot more about the subject than I did when I originally wrote the book. But, in having dug into this subject several times, I have not yet discovered any specific errors--I hope because there aren't any, but it is entirely possible that it is because the literature on this subject is not exactly consistent--at least not in the presentation.

There are numerous variations in the terminology used for the different kinds of supposition. I hope that the lack of clarity in my account is less because of my own confused presentation than it is a reflection of the lack of clarity in the literature itself. I attempted anyway to make my account clearer than what you find in most treatments of the subject, but also more simple--and perhaps, out of necessity in a book for beginners, more simplistic.

All of the accounts I have seen parallel mine, the major difference seems to be that my account only has one level of division, whereas some other treatments divide further. For my purposes in the book, I had no reason to do this.

But I would dispute Critch on a couple of points. He uses the terms: Simple, Personal, and Material (Material being its own category, and Simple and Personal being the two kinds of Formal supposition), and states that these are the divisions employed by Medieval logicians. I agree that these were the terms they employed (although I don't see how the are any clearer than mine, which follow more modern terminology, and, in the case of "Personal" supposition, the medieval term is more confusing), and I agree with his account of Material Supposition (it is the same as mine). But I think his account of Simple and Personal supposition is inaccurate.

First, his definition of Simple supposition is really the definition (or most of the definition) of Personal supposition. Second, his definition of Personal supposition is too restrictive. Simple supposition is not "when a concept supposits for what it signifies", but "when it supposits what it signifies FOR what it signifies." This is what I have called logical supposition (e.g., "man is a species"). And Personal supposition is not only "when a word supposits for a particular," but "when a concept supposits for what it signifies" (but for a thing subordinate to what it signifies). This would include not only the term "Socrates" in the statement, "Socrates is a man", but the term "man" in the same statement. Both supposit for what they signify for a thing subordinate to what they signify, although one is Common (man), and the other Discrete (Socrates), Common and Discrete being yet another way of dividing Formal supposition.

I think the biggest weakness in Critch's account is that it totally leaves out logical supposition--or whatever other term the same kind of supposition may go by. I am relying on William of Sherwood here, and I certainly can't count out the possibility that some Medieval logician somewhere had a different kind of division, but I would be very surprised if any account left logical supposition out of consideration.

Sorry to get technical here, but I do think this is a fascinating subject. If you want a simpler account of all this, you can go back and read my book.

[critch]

Thanks for the comments, Martin. I've never delved so deeply into logic and I am really enjoying the material. Your book, by the way, has been immensely helpful in teaching my class.

As to the confusion in the text, though, you say that man in the sentence "Man was created by God" has real supposition and that it is being used materially. I thought this confusing since in the previous paragraph you used material to describe a kind of supposition. I gather this terminology was meant to avoid using real as a description of the kind of supposition and the way in which it was being used. By using the terms material, simple, and personal instead of material, logical, and real, this confusion could have been avoided.

I gathered most of my information on this issue from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article "Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-terms/#3)." It supports my explanation of simple supposition except in my illustration. I see now that in the sentence "Socrates is a man" both Socrates and man have personal supposition. The wording of my explanation ("supposits for what it signifies") is legitimate and less confusing that Sherwood's.

Regarding personal supposition, I also maintain that I have it basically correct. Perhaps there is a problem with using the term particular? The Encyclopedia states: "Material and simple supposition are contrasted with personal supposition, what we might call the standard case, where a term stands for ordinary objects."

I have not really left out logical supposition, only supplied what I think is a simpler name and explanation of the concept.

Thanks for participating in this forum, Martin. It is very helpful to those us using your book for the first time.

Charlie Ritch
Wesminster School
Birmingham, AL

[martin]

Thanks Charlie,

I'm not near my books right now, but I'll check out the Stanford Encyclopedia article. And I think I see better what you were getting at in the "man is created by God" example. Let me think on that a little and I'll try to post something this weekend on it.

Thanks again.